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Finishing the Job on Section 356(a)(2):  
Closing Loopholes and Providing Consistent 
Treatment to Boot in Tax-Free Reorganizations 
INTRODUCTION 
The Obama administration has recently taken aim at a provision 
in the tax code that allows shareholders to repatriate offshore 
earnings from corporations without ever paying U.S. taxes on the 
money earned. This loophole, called the “boot-within-gain 
limitation,” is one of several problems in section 356(a)(2) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
This loophole works when a shareholder in the United States—
let’s say the shareholder is a corporation itself—owns two foreign 
corporations with earnings that have not been taxed in the United 
States. The shareholder causes the foreign corporations to merge in a 
tax-free reorganization. The shareholder structures the transaction so 
that the acquiring corporation gives its own stock and cash to the 
shareholder in exchange for all of the shareholder’s stock in the target 
corporation. The shareholder takes care to ensure that the cash and 
stock received from the acquiring corporation do not exceed the value 
of the target corporation’s stock. If the shareholder is successful, 
section 356(a)(2)1 allows the shareholder to receive the cash without 
being taxed2—but for this provision, the cash would have finally been 
subject to U.S. federal income tax.3 This loophole also applies when 
the parties to the reorganization are domestic corporations. 
Tax-free reorganizations allow corporations to merge or be acquired 
by other corporations without being taxed on gain realized in the 
transaction. To qualify for tax-free treatment, the transaction has to 
meet specific requirements. The general requirement is that the 
shareholders of the target corporation must receive stock in the 
acquiring corporation as consideration in the transaction. The rationale 
for not taxing these transactions is that the shareholders are not 
 
 1. Unless otherwise specified, all references in this Comment to a “section” refer to a 
section within Title 26 of the United States Code. 
 2. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012). 
 3. Subject to the section 902 foreign tax credit for domestic corporations. See Rev. Rul. 
74-387, 1974-2 C.B. 207 (section 356(a)(2) boot dividends qualify for section 902). 
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“cashing out” their interests in the corporation; instead they are 
continuing their interest in another form. But section 356(a)(2) allows 
shareholders to do just that—cash out their interest in the corporation. 
Generally, if a shareholder receives cash in a reorganization, the 
shareholder is taxed on the cash but can defer tax on the stock 
received.4 But when the cash has the effect of a dividend, section 
356(a)(2) limits the amount of cash that is taxed to the overall gain 
realized in the transaction.5 In other words, if the total consideration 
received in a qualifying reorganization provides a ten-dollar profit to 
the shareholder, but the shareholder receives fifty dollars in cash, 
only ten dollars of that cash is subject to tax. Thus, parties can 
receive cash and avoid paying taxes by throwing some cash, which 
would otherwise be taxed as a dividend, into a reorganization. But 
when does cash have the effect of a dividend? Congress has not 
provided an answer to this question. 
This is not the only problem with section 356(a)(2); it contains 
further opportunities for tax avoidance, it is inconsistent with the 
rest of the Internal Revenue Code, and it is full of uncertainties that 
have existed for ninety years without resolution. 
Because of these shortcomings, section 356(a)(2) has been 
attacked by Congress on-and-off over the last sixty years6 and the 
Obama administration has renewed its focus on this provision for 
2016.7 This Comment discusses the Obama administration’s 
proposals for section 356(a)(2) and provides further 
recommendations for those proposals. I argue that Congress should 
specify when boot has the effect of a dividend and should supplant 
the current Clark rule that has developed in the courts. The 
replacement test should compare the shareholder’s interest in the 
target corporation before the reorganization with the shareholder’s 
interest in the acquiring corporation after the reorganization to 
determine whether there has been a meaningful reduction in interest 
under section 302(b). 
 
 4. See 26 U.S.C. § 356(a) (2012). 
 5. Id. § 356(a)(2). 
 6. See, e.g., Robert A. King, The Tax Treatment of Boot Distributions in Corporate 
Reorganizations under § 356(a)(2)—Commissioner v. Clark, the Latest Word?, 11 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 723, 724–31 (1990). 
 7. See Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 
Revenue Proposals at 119–21 (Feb. 2015), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 
Revenue Proposals]. 
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Part I of this Comment describes the policy, operation, and tax 
consequences of tax-free reorganizations. Part II presents a detailed 
analysis of section 356(a)(2) and its shortcomings. Lastly, Part III 
explains the Obama proposals and a fairly recent proposal from the 
House of Representatives and builds on these proposals to offer 
solutions to the problems in section 356(a)(2). 
I. TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION—GENERALLY 
A transaction qualifies as a tax-free reorganization if it fits within 
one of the seven categories described in section 368. This Part gives 
a brief overview of tax-free reorganizations by first discussing the 
policy behind tax-free reorganizations, second describing the 
different categories of reorganizations, and then discussing the tax 
consequences of a qualifying reorganization. 
A. The Policy of Reorganizations 
The Treasury regulations state that the purpose behind giving 
tax-free treatment to transactions that qualify as reorganizations is 
that the transactions are only “readjustments of corporate 
structures . . . as [ ] required by business exigencies and which effect 
only a readjustment of continuing interest in property under 
modified corporate forms.”8 In other words, the transaction is not an 
actual “sale” of the corporation, but a “mere change in form.” 
There are several policies behind not taxing these “changes in 
form.” First, Congress wants to encourage efficient reorganizations 
that are helpful to businesses and the economy.9 Second, the gains in 
a reorganization are only paper gains; the shareholders’ money is still 
locked up in the corporation and shareholders might not be able to 
pay the tax.10 Third, there is no “basic change in relationships” 
between the corporation and shareholders and there is “not a 
 
 8. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(as amended in 2011). 
 9. S. REP. NO. 66-398, at 17–19 (1924); see also 61 CONG. REC. 6563 (1921) 
(statement of Sen. Watson) (“It is the exchange of the stock of different corporations for 
business purposes; and at a time when so much reorganizations going on in the business 
world, it is thought by all those interested in the upbuilding of the industries of the country at 
this time that this is a very helpful provision.”). 
 10. S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918) (“A provision was inserted designed to establish 
the rule for determining taxable gains in the case of exchanges of property and to negative the 
assertion of tax in the case of certain purely paper transactions.”); see also S. REP. NO. 68-398, 
at 18 (1924). 
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sufficient ‘cashing out’ of proprietary interests” to constitute an 
actual realization event.11 
With the flexibility the Treasury Department, Congress, and the 
courts have given to reorganizations over the years, some 
commentators question whether these policies are still relevant or 
whether reorganizations have “become a pure tax shelter shrouded 
in an incredibly complex statutory scheme” that “is not grounded in 
any overriding public policy.”12 Nevertheless, the overarching policy 
that reorganizations are “mere changes in form,” which are not, in 
substance, realization events, continues to guide the requirements 
for reorganizations. 
B. Reorganization Transactions 
There are seven categories of transactions that qualify as tax-free 
reorganizations. Each category contains specific requirements that must 
be met for the transaction to qualify.13 There are several generally 
applicable requirements that apply to (almost) all of the categories. 
1. Generally applicable requirements 
Tax-free reorganizations have been part of the Internal Revenue 
Code since 1918.14 The judicial refinements that have developed 
over the years are now incorporated into the Treasury Regulations. 
The regulations set minimum requirements applicable for all seven 
categories of reorganizations unless an explicit exception applies: 1) 
continuity of shareholder interest; 2) continuity of business 
 
 11. King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
 12. Everett Skillman, The Non-Recognition of Taxable Gain in Corporate 
Reorganizations—Reassessing Legislative Policy, 20 SW. U. L. REV. 369, 370 (1991); see also 
King, supra note 6, at 755–56. 
 13. Note that the regulations state that each transaction must be evaluated under the 
step-transaction doctrine. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(a). The step-transaction doctrine may cause a 
transaction—standing by itself—to be treated as a mere step in an overall transaction, rather 
than as an independent transaction, if the transaction is part of an overall transaction. Comm’r 
v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989) (“[I]nterrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated 
transaction may not be considered independently of the overall transaction. By thus linking 
together all interdependent steps with legal or business significance, rather than taking them in 
isolation, federal tax liability may be based on a realistic view of the entire transaction.”). Thus, 
an exchange qualifying as a tax-free reorganization by itself might not be given tax-free 
treatment if it is part of a multistep transaction that would not qualify when viewed as a whole. 
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-25, 2008-1 C.B. 986. 
 14. Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057 (1918), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, 
SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1861-1938, at 898 (1938). 
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enterprise; and 3) business purpose.15 These are only minimum 
requirements; a reorganization category itself may set out additional 
or stricter requirements. 
The first requirement, continuity of shareholder interest, is 
central to the underlying policy of tax-free reorganizations; namely, 
shareholders should not be taxed on the transaction because the 
exchange is only a change in the form of the shareholder’s interest in 
the business.16 Essentially, it requires the acquiring corporation to 
furnish its own stock as consideration to the selling shareholders.17 
The regulations suggest that the requirement will be satisfied if at 
least forty percent of the consideration paid in the exchange is in 
stock of the acquiring corporation.18 After the reorganization, the 
shareholders who received the acquiring corporation’s stock are free 
to dispose of the stock at any time as long as it is not to a 
corporation related19 to the issuing corporation.20 
The second requirement, continuity of business enterprise, also 
relates to the rationale that reorganizations are simply 
 
 15. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (as amended in 2011). As discussed above, these 
minimum requirements, applicable to all categories of tax-free reorganizations, may be 
superseded by the provisions relating to the categories themselves. As an example, continuity 
of interest and continuity of business enterprise are not required in connection with 
recapitalizations under section 368(a)(1)(E). 
 16. See supra Part II.A; see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-
1 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 564; BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 500 (2d ed. 1966); PAUL R. MCDANIEL, 
ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 539 (3d ed. 2006). 
 17. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i). For an expansive treatment on the origin and 
development of the continuity of interest requirement, see David. F. Shores, Reexamining 
Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Corporate Reorganizations, 17 VA. TAX REV. 419, 427 
(1998) (“The new regulations shift the focus from whether Seller intended to retain a 
proprietary interest in the reorganized enterprise, to whether a proprietary interest was 
furnished by . . . the acquiring corporation.”). Note that if the reorganization is structured as a 
triangular merger, the parent corporation of the acquiring corporation is required to furnish its 
stock as consideration in the exchange. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b). 
 18. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (stating that continuity of interest requirement 
is met when shareholder receives $60 in cash and $40 in stock of the acquiring corporation); 
see also John A. Nelson Corp. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (holding that shareholder 
receipt of consideration consisting of 38% of acquiring corporation equity qualified as a tax-
free reorganization treatment). 
 19. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(4) (as amended in 2011). The focus is on corporate 
shareholders. Thus, a sale to a human shareholder who owns shares of the acquiring 
corporation will not violate this rule. T.D. 8760, 63 Fed. Reg. 4174, 4176 (Jan. 28, 1998). 
 20. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i) (“[A] mere disposition of stock of the issuing 
corporation received in a potential reorganization to persons not related . . . to the issuing 
corporation is disregarded.”); see also id. § 1.368-1(e)(8), ex. 3. 
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“readjustments of continuing interests in property under modified 
corporate form.”21 This requirement is met if the acquiring 
corporation either 1) continues one line of the target corporation’s 
historic business, or 2) uses a significant portion of the target 
corporation’s assets in a business.22 This requirement is relatively easy 
to meet.23 The business purpose requirement simply requires that the 
transaction “have a business purpose apart from tax avoidance; that 
is, it must be undertaken for reasons germane to the continuance of 
the business of a corporation.”24 Under this requirement, taxpayers 
are not disqualified when minimizing taxes is simply a motive of the 
transaction. But taxpayers are disqualified if the transaction is entered 
into with the main purpose of avoiding taxes.25 The business purpose 
requirement, developed through case law,26 is not explicitly stated in 
the regulations; however, this requirement is widely considered27 to 
be implied in several places throughout the regulations.28 
 
 21. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(1). 
 22. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(1), (2). 
 23. For example, if the target corporation had several lines of business, the acquiring 
corporation is only required to continue one of the significant lines of business. Id. § 1.368-
1(d)(2)(ii), (d)(5), ex. 1. Or if a manufacturing corporation acquires a corporation that makes 
components used in the manufacturing corporation’s product and the acquiring corporation only 
keeps the assets of the target corporation as a backup in case other components from other 
suppliers are in short supply, the continuity of interest requirement will be satisfied. Id. at ex. 2. 
 24. Joseph R. Gomez, Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions for the Corporate Lawyer, 
5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 321, 340–41 (2001).  
 25. To illustrate: in an early case, a sole-shareholder attempted to transfer appreciated 
property from the corporation to herself through a tax-free reorganization which would 
transfer the property to a new corporation that would then be liquidated. Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Out of this case came the famous quote by Judge Learned 
Hand that “[a]ny one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; . . . 
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.” Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 
810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). But the Court held that, in this case, the 
transaction had no business purpose and was done solely for tax avoidance reasons. Gregory, 
293 U.S. at 469. 
 26. See, e.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. 465. 
 27. See, e.g., GOMEZ, supra note 24; David F. Shores, Continuity of Business Enterprise: 
A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, 63 TAX L. 471, 496 (2010); Arturo Requenez II & Joshua 
D. Odintz, New Flexibility Under Final Regs. Affecting Foreign-Law Mergers and Section 367, 
105 J. TAX’N, 151 (Sept. 2006). 
 28. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(2)(as amended in 2010) parenthetically states that 
“business purpose” is one of the general requirements of a reorganization. For other provisions 
where the business purpose requirement is implied, see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (“The 
purpose of the reorganization provisions of the Code is to except from the general rule certain 
specifically described exchanges incident to such readjustments of corporate structures . . . as 
are required by business exigencies . . . . Both the terms of the specifications and their 
underlying assumptions and purposes must be satisfied in order to entitle the taxpayer to the 
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2. Categories of reorganization 
The seven categories of reorganizations in § 368(a)(1)(A)–(G) 
have unique and specific requirements. The categories are often 
referred to in shorthand by reference to the appropriate 
subparagraph—for example, a reorganization structured pursuant to 
§ 368(a)(1)(A) is referred to as a “Type A” reorganization. 
Type A, B, and C reorganizations are the “acquisitive” 
reorganizations. These transactions involve one corporation 
acquiring another corporation. Type A reorganizations are 
“statutory mergers.”29 These are mergers affected pursuant to 
state corporate law. After a Type A reorganization is complete, the 
acquiring corporation will own all assets and liabilities of the 
target corporation, and the target corporation will cease to 
exist.30Type A reorganizations are frequently used in triangular 
reorganizations where the target corporation merges into a 
subsidiary of the acquiring corporation.31 As a result, the 
acquiring corporation is able to shield itself from any liabilities 
assumed from the target corporation while taking advantage of 
the flexibility of Type A reorganizations.32 
Type B reorganizations are “stock for stock acquisitions” where 
the selling shareholders exchange their stock for stock of the 
 
benefit of the exception from the general rule.”); and Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (“[T]he 
readjustments involved in the exchanges . . . must be undertaken for reasons germane to the 
continuance of the business . . . .”). 
 29. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 30. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii); see also Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436. There 
are no further specific requirements for Type A reorganizations; however, Type A 
reorganizations are subject to the generally applicable requirements discussed above. Thus, 
shareholders of the target corporation may receive as much as 60% of the consideration in the 
form of boot and as little as 40% of the consideration in the form of acquiring corporation 
stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1; see also supra Part I.B.1. 
 31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(iii), ex. 4. This type of reorganization is authorized 
by § 368(a)(2)(D). Certain additional requirements apply to such a transaction; namely, 
substantially all of the target corporation’s assets must be acquired, and no stock of the 
subsidiary corporation may be used in the transaction. Thus, the stock must come from the 
parent corporation. Id. The “substantially all” requirement is the same as the “substantially all” 
requirement for Type C reorganizations discussed below. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(2); see 
infra note 37. 
 32. Note that triangular mergers may be structured in varying forms and under other 
reorganization types, such as Type B or C reorganizations. See 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(C)–(D) 
(2012). For an in-depth discussion of triangular tax-free reorganizations, see Stephanie Hoffer 
& Dale A. Oesterle, Tax-Free Reorganizations: The Evolution and Revolution of Triangular 
Mergers, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2014). 
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purchasing corporation.33 Type B reorganizations are less flexible 
than Type A reorganizations, and no boot may be given in a Type B 
reorganization.34 In other words, there is no boot in a B.35 Type C 
reorganizations are asset acquisitions where the acquiring 
corporation purchases the assets of the target corporation.36 The 
target corporation is then required to distribute the consideration to 
its shareholders unless the IRS gives special permission.37 
Type D reorganizations can be structured as either acquisitive 
reorganizations or divisive reorganizations. In Type D acquisitive 
reorganizations, a corporation transfers its assets to another 
corporation, and either the transferring corporation or some of its 
shareholders must be in control of the acquiring corporation after 
the transfer.38 Type D acquisitive reorganizations provide substantial 
 
 33. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 34. Additionally, the acquiring corporation must have control over the target 
corporation immediately after the exchange. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2012). The acquiring 
corporation has control, for purposes of § 368, when it acquires at least 80% of the combined 
voting power of stock and 80% of all other classes of stock. Id. § 368(c). 
 35. Id. § 368(a)(1)(B). This requirement is subject to a minor exception allowing cash 
to be paid in lieu of a fractional share. Rev. Rul. 66-365, 1966-2 C.B. 116, 117. There is an 
additional exception to this rule (although the IRS considers it as a separate exchange rather 
than an exception) that allows a debt-for-debt exchange in connection with a Type B 
reorganization. Rev. Rul. 98-10, 1998-1 C.B. 643. 
 36. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(C)(2012). The acquiring corporation must purchase 
“substantially all of the properties” of the selling corporation. Id. This involves a factual 
analysis of the quantity and quality of the property transferred. See Robert A. Rizzi, Corporate 
Organizations and Reorganizations: Quantity and Quality in the Substantially All 
Requirement, 20 J. CORP. TAX’N 171 (1993). As a safe harbor, this requirement is met if the 
acquiring corporation receives 90% of the target corporation’s net assets and 70% of the target 
corporation’s gross assets. Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.01, 1977-2 C.B. 568. Additionally, at least 
80% of the consideration paid to the target corporation must be the acquiring corporation’s 
voting stock. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012). This requirement is more complicated 
when the acquiring corporation purchases less than 100% of the target corporation’s assets. 
The statute requires that at least 80% of the corporation’s total assets be paid for in voting 
stock. Thus, if the target corporation only sells 90% of its assets, the acquiring corporation 
must still exchange voting stock equal to the value of at least 80% of the corporation’s total 
assets, limiting the amount of remaining consideration that may be boot. There are also special 
rules when the acquiring corporation assumes the liabilities of the target corporation. If the 
acquiring corporation does not use boot, the assumption of liabilities is not treated as boot. Id. 
§ 368(a)(1)(C). But if the acquiring corporation uses boot, the assumption of liabilities will be 
treated as boot and will count against the 20% boot allowance. Id. § 368(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
 37. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(G) (2012). 
 38. Id. § 368(a)(1)(D). The “continuity of interest” requirement is specifically excused 
for Type D acquisitive reorganizations; however, the continuity of interest requirement is 
inherent in the requirement that the transferee corporation or shareholders control the 
acquiring corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(as amended in 2011). 
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flexibility in structuring the transaction.39 A Type D “divisive” 
reorganization occurs when one corporation is divided into two or 
more corporations by transferring part of its assets to another 
corporation and distributing the shares of the other corporation to 
its shareholders.40 
The remaining categories of reorganizations relate to internal 
corporate restructuring. Type E reorganizations are 
recapitalizations;41 Type F reorganizations are changes in identity, 
form, or place of organization;42 and Type G reorganizations involve 
transfers in connection with a bankruptcy plan.43 
C. Tax Consequences 
Under the tax code, a sale or exchange of property results in a 
“realization” event where either gain or loss is realized.44 Unless 
there is a specific exception in the code, realized gains or losses from 
sales of property must be “recognized” and included in gross 
income.45 Section 354(a)(1) provides such an exception for 
shareholders (whether corporate or human) who, pursuant to a plan 
of reorganization, exchange securities in a corporation that is a party 
to a reorganization for securities in another corporation that is a 
party to the reorganization.46The corporations that are themselves 
the subjects of the reorganization will not recognize any gain on the 
corporate level if the transaction is structured properly.47 
 
 39. See Jasper L. Cummings Jr., The Stockless D Reorganization Regulations, 112 J. 
TAX’N 96 (Feb. 2010); Thomas W. Avent Jr., Transfers of Assets to Controlled Corporations: The 
All Cash D Reorganization, 32 CORP. TAX’N 3 (May/June 2005). Recent regulations state 
that the consideration may be 100% cash if the same shareholders own all the shares of the 
transferring corporation and the acquiring corporation in identical proportions. Treas. Reg. § 
1.368-2(l)(2) (if the same shareholders own all of the shares of the transferring corporation 
and the acquiring corporation in identical proportions, the consideration may be purely in the 
form of cash and still qualify as a tax-free reorganization). 
 40. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (2012). This type of reorganization must meet additional 
requirements found in section 355. 
 41. Id. § 368(a)(1)(E). A recapitalization may occur, for example, when a shareholder 
exchanges his interest for a different kind of equity interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(e)(as 
amended in 2010). 
 42. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) (2012). 
 43. Id. § 368(a)(1)(G). 
 44. Id. § 1001 (2012). 
 45. Id. §§ 1001(c); 61(a)(3), 1(a), 11(a). 
 46. Id. § 354(a)(1) (2012). 
 47. Id. § 361(a) (2012). 
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The tax consequences to shareholders are the focus of the 2016 
revenue proposals and this Comment. Limitations exist on the 
nonrecognition rule provided for shareholders under section 354 
that are not important for purposes of this comment.48 But one 
important limitation under section 354(a)(1) is that the only 
property that can be exchanged is “stock or securities.”49 This 
apparently strict limitation is loosened by section 356(a), which 
provides that if something other than stock or securities is exchanged 
in an exchange that would otherwise qualify under section 354, then 
the shareholder will be taxed on the additional property received and 
nonrecognition treatment will still be available for the stock or 
securities.50 This “other property received” is referred to as “boot.” 
Boot may consist of any type of property, including cash. 
The tax that would have been recognized by the shareholder, if 
not for the reorganization provisions, does not disappear, it is merely 
deferred. The shareholders take a basis in the property received tax-
free (i.e., the stock or securities) equal to the basis the shareholders 
had in the property they surrendered.51 The basis of the securities 
surrendered will typically be the original amount the shareholder 
paid for them.52 If the shareholder later sells the securities received in 
the reorganization, the shareholder will be taxed on the amount for 
which the shareholder sold the securities less the shareholder’s basis 
in the securities53—this is called “gain.” Thus, shareholders will 
eventually be taxed on the securities received in a reorganization 
when the shareholders ultimately dispose of the securities.54 
II. BOOT THAT HAS THE EFFECT OF A DIVIDEND 
Section 356(a) provides relief to the strict requirement of section 
354 that consideration be in the form of stock or securities: 
 
 48. For example, under § 354(a)(2), nonrecognition is only allowed to the point that 
the securities exchanged are equal in value and any excess will be taxable. Other limitations are 
found in § 354 but are not important for purposes of this Comment. 
49.  26 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1) (2012). 
50.  Id. § 356(a). 
 51. Id. § 358(a). Special tracing provisions apply when a reorganization involves boot. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(b) (as amended in 2011). Typically the reorganization agreement 
should identify which shares are received in exchange for boot. Id. If the agreement fails to 
specify, then the boot will be applied against each security pro rata. Id. 
 52. 26 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2012). 
 53. Id. § 1001(a) (emphasis added). 
 54. Assuming the securities are not held until death so that 26 U.S.C. § 1014 applies. 
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(1) Recognition of gain 
If—(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the 
fact that (B) the property received in the exchange consists not only 
of property permitted by section 354 . . . but also of other property or 
money,  then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but 
in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair 
market value of such other property.55 
In other words, the shareholder will recognize any boot received 
in the transaction; however, the amount recognized is limited by the 
gain on the overall transaction. For example, if a shareholder 
exchanges stock with a basis of $100 for stock with a fair market 
value of $80 and $40 in cash in a qualifying reorganization, then the 
shareholder will only recognize $20 of the cash received because the 
total gain on the transaction was $20. This is known as the boot-
within-gain limitation. 
Historically, boot received in reorganizations was taxed at capital 
gains rates.56 Congress became concerned that taxpayers were using 
boot payments in reorganizations to bailout corporate earnings and 
profits at capital gains rates.57 In response to this concern, Congress 
added what is now section 356(a)(2) to the Internal Revenue Code 
in 1924: 
Treatment as dividend 
If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the 
distribution of a dividend . . . , then there shall be treated as a 
dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized 
under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the 
undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated 
after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain 
recognized under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the 
exchange of property.58 
This provision has remained largely unchanged since 192459 and 
has been subject to extensive criticism.60 
 
 55. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 56. See King, supra note 6, at 725–26; cf. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012). 
 57. H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 14–15, (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 15–16 (1924). 
 58. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id.; cf. Internal Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(d)(2), 43 Stat. 253, 257. 
 60. See infra Part III. 
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The treatment of a “dividend” under section 356(a)(2) 
substantially differs from section 301’s treatment of a dividend. First, 
it is limited by the “boot-within-gain limitation” described above.61 
Second, the dividend is limited to the shareholder’s “ratable share” 
of earnings and profits.62 Third, the dividend is only subject to the 
accumulated earnings and profits, as opposed to the current earnings 
first and then the accumulated earnings.63 
Section 356(a)(2) also leaves several things uncertain. The 
statute does not say whether to look to the target corporation’s or 
the acquiring corporation’s earnings and profits. And, importantly, 
the statute, as well as the legislative history, is silent on the issue of 
when boot has the effect of a dividend.64 Each of these issues is 
discussed in turn below after a general explanation of the taxation of 
dividends and purpose of section 356(a)(2). 
A. Dividend Taxation and the Purpose of Section 356(a)(2) 
Shareholders may receive money for their ownership interest in a 
corporation in various ways. First, a shareholder may simply sell his 
shares in the corporation to another party in an arms-length 
transaction. The shareholder will be able to offset the amount 
received against his basis and the gain on the sale will be taxed as 
capital gain.65 Characterization of gain as capital gain is advantageous 
because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary 
income.66 
Alternatively, shareholders may receive money for their interest in 
a corporation through a redemption, where a corporation buys back 
its own stock from a shareholder.67 The money the shareholder 
receives from the corporation may be characterized as either a sale 
 
 61. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012). In contrast, dividends under section 301 are taxed 
on their entire amount. Id. §§ 301(a), (c), 316(a).  
 62. Id. § 356(a)(2). Earnings and profits are discussed in Section II.A. Contrast this 
provision with section 316(a), which subjects shareholders to the corporation’s entire earnings 
and profits. Id.§ 316(a). 
 63. Id. § 356(a)(2). Compare with § 316(a), which states that a dividend is any 
distribution made from current earnings and profits first and then accumulated earnings and 
profits.Id.§ 316(a). 
 64. See King, supra note 6, at 727. 
 65. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1222 (2012).  
 66. For example, in 2014, taxpayers whose taxable income falls in the 39.6% tax bracket 
are only taxed at 20% on their capital gains. Id. 1(h)(1)(D). 
67.   Id. § 317(b). 
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(subject to a basis offset and capital gains treatment), or as a 
dividend.68 Section 302(b) gives several tests to determine if the 
money received should be treated as a sale. The overarching purpose 
of the tests is to give sale treatment to redemptions that “result in a 
meaningful reduction of the shareholder’s proportionate interest in 
the corporation.”69 Section 302(b)(2) is a safe harbor for the 
meaningful reduction test. Section 302(b)(2) states that a 
meaningful reduction occurs when (1) “after the redemption the 
shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total combined voting 
power of all classes of [voting] stock,” and (2) the percentage of 
voting and common stock “owned by the shareholder immediately 
after the redemption . . . is less than 80% of [the interest the 
shareholder had before the redemption]”—in other words, the 
shareholder’s interest must decrease by more than 20%.70 Section 
302(b)’s meaningful reduction test is used in section 356(a)(2) to 
determine whether boot is taxed as a capital gain or if boot has the 
effect of a dividend. 
Shareholders may also receive money for their ownership interest 
through dividends from the corporation. A dividend is defined in 
section 316(a) as a distribution from a corporation out of its current 
and accumulated earnings and profits (“earnings”).71 Therefore, 
money paid from a corporation to its shareholders is only a dividend 
to the extent of the corporation’s earnings. For the sake of simplicity, 
earnings and profits can loosely be defined as profits (after expenses) 
that the corporation does not pay out to its shareholders.72First, the 
earnings of the current tax year are examined to determine if the 
amount is a dividend, and then the accumulated earnings of prior 
years are examined.73 Thus, if a corporation made a profit in the year 
it paid money to its shareholders, but operated at a loss every prior 
year, the prior year losses would not offset the current year earnings 
 
 68. Id. § 302(a), (d).  
 69. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970). 
 70. 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(2)(B), (C). Under section (C), shares of family members and 
related parties may be attributed to the shareholder. Id. § 302(b)(2)(C). 
71. Id. § 316(a)(2012). 
 72. A more circumscribed, but still rough, definition of earnings and profits is taxable 
income plus excluded receipts (such as tax exempt income, e.g., interest from municipal 
bonds) minus nondeductible disbursements (e.g. federal tax payments). See 26 U.S.C. § 
312(a) (2012); JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, 
PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 202 (4th ed. 2012). 
 73. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(a). 
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for purposes of determining whether the distribution was a dividend. 
If the corporation pays out any money in excess of its current year 
and accumulated earnings, that excess will first be offset by the 
shareholder’s basis (and thus not be taxed).74 If there is cash left over 
after being offset by the shareholder’s basis, the excess is taxed as 
capital gain.75 
If the corporation has sufficient earnings, then the entire amount 
of the distribution is included in the shareholder’s gross income, and 
the shareholder’s basis in stock of the corporation will not offset any 
of the amount taxed. Historically, dividends were taxed at higher 
rates than ordinary income.76 Due to these tax consequences, 
shareholders may have a preference for receiving funds from the 
corporation that are characterized as capital gains.77 This may drive a 
transaction to be structured so that taxpayers can bailout corporate 
earnings at capital-gains rates.78 It was precisely this reason that 
prompted the creation of section 356(a)(2). 
Section 356(a)(2) was promulgated to prevent abuse where boot 
paid in a reorganization is, in reality, a disguised dividend. The 
legislative history of section 356(a)(2) provides an illustration of the 
potential for abuse: 
Corporation A has capital stock of $100,000, and earnings and 
profits . . . of $50,000. If it distributes the $50,000 as dividend to 
its stockholders, the amount distributed will be taxed at the full 
surtax rates. 
On the other hand, Corporation A may organize Corporation B, to 
which it transfers all its assets, the consideration for the transfer 
being the issuance by B of all its stock and $50,000 in cash to the 
 
 74. 26 U.S.C. § 301(c)(2) (2012). 
 75. Id. § 301(c)(3). 
 76. Currently, the stakes aren’t quite as high because dividends are taxed at the same 
rates as capital gains. Id. § 1(h)(11).. But this has only been the case since 2003. See Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 760–64 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. 752). Moreover, even though the tax 
rates are the same, dividends are not capital gains—thus, shareholders cannot offset dividends 
with basis. 
 77. 26 U.S.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 61(a)(7) (2012). A shareholder that is a corporation might 
prefer dividends to take advantage of the dividends-received deduction of section 243. See Rev. 
Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197 (dividend-boot from section 356(a)(2) qualifies for section 
243 deduction). 
 78. See, e.g., Daniel M. Schneider, Internal Revenue Code § 355 Before and After the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986: A Study in the Regulation of Corporate Tax Bailouts, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 
567, 567–77 (1986). 
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stockholders of Corporation A in exchange for their stock in 
Corporation A. Under the existing law, the $50,000 distributed 
with the stock of Corporation B would be taxed, not as a dividend, 
but as a capital gain, subject [to more favorable rates]. The effect of 
such a distribution is obviously the same as if the corporation had 
declared out as a dividend its $50,000 earnings and profits. If 
dividends are to be subject to the full surtax rates, then such an 
amount so distributed should also be subject to the surtax rates and 
not to the [favorable] rate on capital gain.79 
To prevent “bailouts” of earnings at capital gains rates, section 
356(a)(2) states that if boot has the effect of a dividend, it shall be 
treated as a dividend.80 But section 356(a)(2) contains several 
provisions that have resulted in uncertainty, inconsistency in the 
code, and increased complexity. 
B. The Boot-Within-Gain Limitation 
Section 356(a)(2) incorporates section 356(a)(1)’s boot-within-
gain limitation. Therefore, the boot treated as a dividend will only be 
recognized to the extent of gain on the overall transaction.81 The 
boot-within-gain limitation is the most criticized way that section 
356(a)(2)’s treatment of dividends is inconsistent with the rest of the 
Internal Revenue Code.82 
The boot-within-gain limitation has recently received attention 
in the context of cross-border reorganizations. Consider the 
following example: 
a) Parent, a United States corporation, owns FS1 and FS2, 
foreign subsidiary corporations; 
b) Both FS1 and FS2 have substantial earnings that have not 
been taxed by the United States government; 
c) FS2’s stock is worth $100; Parent’s basis in FS2 stock 
is $100; 
 
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 15 (1923). 
80. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2)(2012). 
 81. See supra note 58 and the accompanying text.  
 82. See infra Part III. 
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d) FS1 purchases FS2’s stock from Parent for $90 cash and 
$10 worth of FS1 stock in a qualifying Type-D 
reorganization.83 
In this transaction, Parent did not realize any gain.84 Thus, under 
section 356(a)(2), Parent would not be taxed on the $90 of cash 
received. Since FS1 had earnings that were never taxed by the 
United States at the corporate level, Parent received $90 cash 
without paying any domestic taxes on it.85 
The problem with the boot-within-gain limitation in section 
356(a)(2) is not limited to repatriation of earnings. Domestic 
corporations can use a reorganization to bailout earnings without 
paying the second-level shareholder tax.86 As a general policy matter, 
section 356(a)(1)’s boot-within-gain limitation rule makes sense 
because, if the boot is characterized as a sale, a sale would not be 
taxed if there was no gain on the sale. But when the boot is 
characterized as a dividend, the justification for this  limitation falls 
apart because dividends are typically included in ordinary income 
and taxed in their entirety. 
The boot-within-gain limitation is internally inconsistent with 
the Internal Revenue Code. Compare the limitation to section 301 
where dividends are taxed in their entirety.87 In section 302, if a 
redemption does not meet one of the 302(b) tests for sale treatment, 
it is treated as a distribution under section 301 and taxed in its 
entirety. In section 304, if a shareholder has a controlling interest in 
 
 83. This example is based on an example in Joseph M. Calianno & Brad Rode, 
Navigating the IRS’s Attack on Perceived Repatriation Transactions, 39 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 
197, 205 (2010). 
 84. Additionally, the acquiring subsidiary could make a check-the-box election to 
change the target subsidiary’s classification from a corporation to a disregarded entity. See 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1996). The target subsidiary would be deemed as distributing all 
of its assets to the acquiring subsidiary in liquidation, and the parent corporation would 
remove one layer of control between itself and the target corporation. 
 85. For further discussion on the use of section 356 to repatriate earnings from foreign 
subsidiaries, see Calianno & Rode, supra note 83, at 204.  
 86. Some commentators have even suggested that boot limited by section 356(a)(2)’s 
boot-within-gain limitation might cause the earnings of the target corporation to be reduced 
under section 312, even though the boot was not taxed. Id. at n.46 (“Since § 312 contains no 
specific rules about the effect of a boot-distribution on E&P, the general rules of § 312 seem to 
require a reduction in E&P by the amount of distribution without regard to the amount actually 
taxable to the recipient shareholders.”) (quoting George C. Koutouras et al., “Boot Distributions 
and Assumption of Liabilities,” 782-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S. Income, at IV-C-8). 
 87. This assumes that there are sufficient earnings in the corporation so that section 
301(c)(1) applies. 
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two corporations and corporation one buys the shareholder’s stock 
in corporation two, the shareholder’s interest in corporation two is 
subject to the section 302(b) test. If the shareholder fails, the entire 
amount received is taxed as a distribution under section 301. There 
is no clear policy reason for treating section 356(a)(2) dividends 
differently than these other sections.88 As a matter of internal 
consistency, the boot-within-gain limitation of section 356(a)(2) 
needlessly complicates the tax code. 
In a practical sense, the boot-within-gain limitation of section 
356(a)(2) may only benefit shareholders seeking to avoid tax by 
bailing out corporate earnings. Some commentators suggest that 
section 356(a)(2)’s boot-within-gain limitation can only be 
explained as a drafting error.89 Because of the “incoherent” nature of 
this rule,90 Congress has been calling for its repeal off and on since 
1954.91 All attempts, both historical and recent, to eliminate the 
boot-within-gain limitation have failed.92 
C. Ratable Share of Earnings 
If boot has the effect of a dividend, section 356(a)(2) limits the 
boot that is treated as a dividend to the shareholder’s ratable share of 
the earnings of the corporation. To illustrate, suppose that target 
corporation has $100 of earnings, shareholder owns 25% of target 
corporation, shareholder has zero basis in his stock, and shareholder 
receives $50 cash that has the effect of a dividend and $50 of stock 
in a reorganization. The shareholder will have $100 of gain and the 
$50 of cash will not be limited by the boot-within-gain limitation. 
But the shareholder’s ratable share of the corporation’s earnings is 
 
 88. Even past defenders of this rule were unable to answer why dividends should receive 
different treatment if received pursuant to a reorganization than if received from a traditional 
corporate distribution. See, e.g., Advisory Group Recommendations of Subchapters C, J, and K of 
the Internal Revenue Code: Hearing on H.R. 4459 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
86th Cong. Congress, 745–800 (1959) (showing that at a Congressional hearing supporters 
of the boot-within-gain limitation testified that it was unfair to tax a shareholder on boot if the 
exchange resulted in loss to the shareholder, but were unable to explain why boot treated as a 
dividend in a reorganization should be treated differently than an ordinary dividend). 
 89. See Bruce D. Shoulson, Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX. 
L. REV. 573, 578–79 (1965). 
 90. S. REP. NO. 98-95, at 94 (1983) (Conf. Rep.). 
 91. King, supra note 6, at 728–31. 
 92. See infra text accompanying notes 8–1549. 
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only $25; therefore, only $25 of the boot received will be taxed as a 
dividend while the rest will be taxed as capital gain. 
The ratable share rule is another way shareholders can bailout 
corporate earnings. There are many opportunities for shareholders in 
closely held corporations to structure a transaction to bailout 
earnings, especially since the attribution rules do not apply.93 For 
example, Husband owns 75% of Mom & Pop Corporation and Wife 
owns 25%. Mom & Pop has $100 of earnings, and Husband and 
Wife both have zero basis in their shares. Mom & Pop is acquired in 
a qualifying reorganization for $200 of Acquiring Corporation stock 
and $100 cash, and Husband and Wife receive a proportionate share 
of stock and boot. Assume the exchange has the effect of a dividend. 
Husband would receive $75 cash and $150 of Acquiring stock and 
Wife would receive $25 cash and $50 of Acquiring stock. All $100 
of boot received would be taxed as a dividend. 
But Husband and Wife can structure the transaction above so 
that Wife receives all of the boot and $50 of Acquiring stock and 
Husband receives the rest of the stock. Only $25 of the boot will be 
taxed as a dividend because Wife’s ratable share of the corporation’s 
earnings is only $25. If section 356(a)(2) treated dividends 
consistently with the rest of the tax code, all $75 that Wife received 
would be taxed because all of the corporation’s earnings would 
apply. This example demonstrates how the ratable share rule can lead 
to abuse in closely held corporations. 
The ratable share rule also creates internal inconsistencies in the 
code. In sections 301(c) and 316, distributions to a shareholder are 
determined with reference to all of the corporation’s earnings.94 
When applicable, the corporation’s entire earnings are also used in 
redemptions under section 302 and sales to a related corporation 
under section 304. There is no convincing policy reason to give 
 
 93. 318(a) provides that an individual or entity may be deemed as owning the stock 
owned by other family members and entities. 26 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012). Section 318(a) only 
applies when “the rules contained in this section are expressly made applicable.” Id. In section 
356(a)(2), attribution is only applied when determining whether boot has the effect of a 
dividend, not in determining the shareholder’s ratable share of earnings. Id. § 356(a). 
 94. 26 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, every 
distribution is made out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof, and from the most 
recently accumulated earnings and profits.”). 
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different treatment to shareholders receiving boot deemed as a 
dividend under section 356.95 
D. Accumulated Earnings 
Section 356(a)(2) states that boot that has the effect of a 
dividend will be taxed to the extent of the shareholder’s ratable share 
of the corporation’s earnings “accumulated.”96 This provision could 
mean one of two things. At worst, it could mean that only the 
accumulated earnings, and not the current year earnings, are 
considered. At best, this provision means that the accumulated 
earnings may offset the corporation’s current earnings. Both 
interpretations are unsatisfactory. 
For sections 301, 302, and 304, the regulations in section 316 
provide that, in determining whether a distribution is made out of 
the corporation’s earnings, the earnings of the current tax year 
should be examined first.97 Then, if the distribution exceeds the 
current year earnings, the accumulated earnings should be used to 
determine whether the excess is a dividend.98 So, when a corporation 
makes a profit in the year it distributes money to its shareholders, 
but operates at a loss every prior year, the prior year losses will not 
offset the current year earnings for purposes of determining whether 
the distribution is a dividend. 
Because section 316 distinguishes between accumulated earnings 
and current year earnings, section 356(a)(2) may be interpreted to 
mean that boot is only a dividend to the extent of accumulated 
earnings without counting current year earnings.99 This 
interpretation is likely wrong. 
 
 95. In 1959, in a hearing before the Ways and Means committee, the stated purpose of 
the ratable share rule was to provide “for the treatment of boot received by holders of 
preferred stock.” Advisory Group Recommendations of Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal 
Revenue Code: Hearing on H.R. 4459Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 
473, 546 (1959). Whatever merits this policy reason may have, it does not explain why the 
ratable share rule is also applied to holders of common stock. 
96. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2)(2012). 
97. Id. § 316(a) 
 98. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(a). 
 99. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Technical Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions Contained in the “American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010,” for 
Consideration on the Floor of the House of Representatives, JCX-29-10, at 303 (2010) 
(hereinafter “JCT Explanation”) (proposing to eliminate section 356(a)(2)’s reference to 
“accumulated” earnings, so “that earnings and profits references in section 356(a)(2) not be 
interpreted to exclude current year earnings and profits”). 
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Prior to 1936, the predecessor to section 316 simply referred to 
distributions out of “accrued” earnings.100 During this time, 
distributions were determined by current year earnings as well as 
accumulated earnings.101 In 1936 Congress amended the predecessor 
to section 316 to state a separate category of distributions out of the 
current year’s earnings so that taxpayers could receive credits against 
an undistributed profits surtax, now defunct, when the corporation 
had operated at a loss in prior years and would otherwise be unable 
to pay a dividend.102 
Present-day section 356(a)(2) was drafted prior to the 1936 
amendment to present-day section 316.103 Because both current year 
and accumulated earnings were used before the amendment to 
section 316, the better interpretation of section 356(a)(2) is that the 
current year earnings and the prior year losses will be used to 
determine the amount of the distribution taxed as a dividend.104 
Either way, there is no logical reason why distributions under section 
356(a)(2) should be limited in this way when they are not limited in 
the rest of the code. 
E. Earnings of Which Corporation? 
Section 356(a)(2) directs that, in determining how much of the 
deemed dividend is taxed as a dividend, the ratable share of the 
accumulated earnings of “the corporation” must be taken into 
account. The statute leaves open the question of which corporation’s 
earnings must be taken into account—target or acquiring. 
For corporations whose ownership is not identical, the IRS and 
courts have stated that only the earnings of the target corporation are 
 
 100. See Harry J. Rudick, “Dividends” and “Earnings or Profits” Under the Income Tax 
Law: Corporate Non-Liquidating Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 867 (1941). 
 101. See id. at 867–69; see also Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344 (1918) (“Dividends 
are . . . expended as such by the stockholder without regard to whether they are declared from 
the most recent earnings, or from a surplus accumulated from the earnings of the past, or are 
based on the increased value of the property of the corporation.”). 
 102. See Rudick, supra note 100 at 868–69. Rudick argues that the distinction in section 
316 should be done away with and that shareholders should be able to offset current year 
earnings against prior deficits. Id. at 904–05. Perhaps Rudick would support the current 
language of section 356(a)(2). 
 103. See Internal Revenue Act of 1924 § 203(d)(2), 43 Stat. 253 (1924). 
 104. Cf. Vesper Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 131 F.2d 200, 205 (8th Cir. 1942) 
(holding that both current and accumulated earnings are taken into account in interpreting a 
statutory provision regarding redemptions with language similar to section 356(a)(2)). 
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taken into account.105 Although the language in the statute is 
ambiguous, this conclusion makes sense because section 356(a)(2) was 
drafted to address the bailout of the target corporation’s earnings.106 
The harder question is which corporation’s earnings should be 
considered when the corporations’ ownership is identical. Courts are 
split on this question. The IRS and the Fifth Circuit believe that the 
earnings of both corporations should be taken into account because 
when “there is complete identity . . . the stockholders control both 
corporations and it is virtually impossible to tell which corporation is 
in reality ‘the corporation’ distributing the cash.” 107 But the Third 
Circuit and the Tax Court take the view that only the target 
corporation’s earnings should be taken into account.108 Although the 
Tax Court and Third Circuit’s position may seem counterintuitive, 
the plain language of the statute seems to support this result.109 This 
provision creates uncertainty for taxpayers and “it is up to Congress 
to correct this defect.”110 
F. When Does Boot Have the Effect of a Dividend? 
Section 356(a)(2) only applies when boot has the effect of a 
dividend. But Congress failed to mention when boot has the effect 
of a dividend. Instead, Congress left this messy  question for the 
courts to deal with. 
The first judicial decisions to decide the matter held that all boot 
received pursuant to a reorganization had the effect of a dividend.111 
 
 105. Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975 C.B. 112 (“[R]egardless of which corporation makes a 
distribution, the amount of the dividend is measured by reference to the earnings and profits 
of the transferor.”); see, e.g., Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl. 1959); 
Hawkinson v. Comm’r, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Comm’r v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th 
Cir. 1934). 
106. See supra Part II.A. 
 107. Davant v. Comm’r, 366 F.2d 874, 889 (5th Cir. 1966); Rev. Rul. 70-240,        
1970-1 C.B. 81. 
 108. Atlas Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 614 F.2d 860, 867–68 (3d Cir. 1980); Am. Mfg. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 55 T.C. 204, 224–31 (1970). 
 109. See Am. Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 231. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See e.g., Owens, 69 F.2d at 598; Knapp Monarch Co. v. Comm’r, 1 T.C. 59 (1942); J. 
Weingarten Inc. v. Comm’r, 44 B.T.A. 798, 805–10 (1941); McCord v. Comm’r,, 31 B.T.A. 
342 (1934); Woodard v. Comm’r,, 30 B.T.A. 1216, 1227–28 (1934). The Supreme Court even 
seemed to adopt this automatic dividend rule in Comm’r v. Bedford’s Estate, where it held that 
cash received in a recapitalization reorganization, where the corporation has sufficient earnings, 
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This so-called “automatic dividend rule” makes sense from a strict 
policy perspective. If reorganizations are simply a “mere change in 
form” of the corporation,112 then any cash received must necessarily 
be a dividend because the shareholder’s interest in the corporation 
does not change, it just continues on in another form. But this 
ignores the law that has developed around reorganizations which 
allows shareholders to sell a limited amount of their interest and still 
qualify for tax-free treatment.113 
The automatic dividend rule was widely criticized and did not 
last very long.114 The IRS abandoned the automatic dividend rule 
and took the position that the test to determine section 356(a)(2) 
dividend equivalency should be similar to the tests in section 
302(b).115 Courts followed this approach, but differed on how they 
applied section 302(b) to reorganizations. 
Two competing views emerged. The first, called the Shimberg 
test, treated the boot as a hypothetical redemption of the target 
corporation’s stock before the reorganization.116 The second 
approach, called the Wright test, treated the boot as a hypothetical 
redemption of the acquiring corporation’s stock after the 
reorganization.117 The Supreme Court resolved this split in 
Commissioner v. Clark and adopted the Wright test (now called the 
Clark test).118 
In Clark, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a 
corporation.119 The taxpayer’s corporation merged with a much 
larger publicly traded corporation. Initially, the acquiring corporation 
offered the taxpayer 425,000 shares of the acquiring corporation for 
all of the target corporation’s shares.120 The taxpayer turned down 
 
is a dividend. 325 U.S. 283, 290–91 (1945). The Court even went a step further in dicta 
suggesting that the same result may be reached in acquisitive reorganizations. Id. 
 112. See supra Part II.A. 
 113. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 114. See King, supra note 6 at 734; Stephen Massey, Boot Distributions in Corporate 
Reorganizations: Dividend Equivalence and the Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 32 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 119, 132 (1980). 
 115. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121. 
 116. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 117. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 606–08 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 118. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 737–40 (1989). 
 119. Id. at 731. 
 120. Id. 
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that offer and accepted a counter-offer for 300,000 shares of the 
acquiring corporation and $3,250,000 cash.121 
Under the Shimberg test the taxpayer had a 100% interest in the 
target corporation before the reorganization. The taxpayer would be 
deemed to have sold a certain amount of shares to the target 
corporation for the cash. The taxpayer’s interest in the target 
corporation after this hypothetical redemption—deemed to occur 
before the reorganization—would still be 100%. Because this is not a 
meaningful reduction in interest, the boot would be deemed a 
dividend. The Court recognized that the Shimberg test will result in 
dividend treatment any time shareholders receive boot pro rata in a 
reorganization.122 Because it is often the case that boot will be 
distributed pro rata, the Court adopted the Wright test instead.123 
Following the Wright test, the taxpayer was treated as receiving 
the full 425,000 shares originally offered and then redeeming 
125,000 of those shares—to reflect his actual interest in the 
acquiring corporation of 300,000—after the reorganization.124 
Viewed this way, the taxpayer’s interest in the acquiring corporation 
was 1.30% before the redemption and 0.92% after the deemed 
redemption.125 This reduction in interest qualified for sale treatment 
under the section 302(b) 50/80 test126discussed in section II.A. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the boot did not have the effect of a 
dividend and that the boot should be taxed as capital gain.127 
An important policy driving this decision was that the Supreme 
Court did not want every pro rata distribution of cash to result in a 
dividend.128 The Court also reasoned that dividend treatment is meant 
to be the exception to capital gains treatment in section 356.129 The 
Court recognized, however, that both of the competing views were 
“somewhat artificial” and chose the test that was “less artificial.”130 
 
 121. Id 
 122. Id. at 739. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 740. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 738–39. 
 129. Id. at 739. 
 130. Id. at 741. 
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The test for whether boot has the effect of a dividend has been 
resolved by Clark. But the Clark test is not a perfect test. Clark was 
simply a choice between the lesser of two evils. Congress should 
finish the job they started ninety years ago by clarifying when boot 
has the effect of a dividend and supplanting Clark with a test that is 
less artificial. 
III. FIXING SECTION 356(A)(2) 
Due to the shortcomings of section 356(a)(2) discussed above, 
section 356(a)(2) has been attacked by Congress on-and-off for the 
last sixty years.131 Section 356(a)(2)’s boot-within-gain limitation, in 
particular, has been subject to widespread criticism.132 The Obama 
administration began targeting section 356(a)(2)’s boot-within-gain 
limitation in 2009. In February 2015, the Obama administration 
proposed repealing the boot-within-gain limitation and aligning 
section 356(a)(2)’s treatment of earnings with section 316.133 On 
May 28, 2010, the House approved a bill that would have 
substantially revised section 356(a)(2);134however, the revision did 
not make it into final law.135 
Section 356(a)(2) can be improved by building on the Obama 
proposals and the 2010 House bill. In addition, Congress should 
amend section 356(a)(2) to explicitly direct when boot will have the 
effect of a dividend. This amendment should supplant the Clark rule 
with a test that compares the shareholder’s economic interest in the 
target corporation before the reorganization with the shareholder’s 




 131. For a comprehensive treatment of these attacks, see King, supra note 6, at 728–31. 
 132. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Form vs. Substance in the Treatment of Taxable 
Corporate Distributions, 85 TAXES 119, 129 (2007) (stating that “there is no known reason” 
for the boot-within-gain limitation); Seth Green & Stafford Smiley, The Curious Case of the 
Partial Loophole Closer, CORP. TAX’N, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 38; Bruce D. Shoulson, Boot 
Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L. REV. 573, 578–79 (1964) (stating 
that the boot-within-gain limitation was a drafting error). 
 133. 2016 Revenue Proposals, supra note 7, at 121. 
 134. American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 
422 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 House Bill]. 
 135. See Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-205, 
124 Stat. 2236 (2010). 
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A. Fixing Section 356(a)(2) with the House Bill and the 
Obama Proposal 
The 2016 Revenue Proposals and the 2010 House bill would 
both amend section 356(a)(2) to be more consistent with the rest of 
the Internal Revenue Code. Section 356(a)(2) should be revised 
using the Obama proposal and the 2010 House bill as a template 
with further improvements discussed below. 
The Obama proposal specifically proposes repealing the boot-
within-gain limitation.136 The 2010 House bill also would repeal the 
limitation by striking the following language: “then there shall be 
treated as a dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain 
recognized under paragraph (1).”137 Repealing the boot-within-gain 
limitation is an important way section 356(a)(2) can be amended to 
stop abusive bailouts—as discussed in Section II.B— and bring 
section 356(a)(2)’s treatment of dividends in conformity with the 
rest of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Prior to the 2016 Revenue Proposals, the Obama administration 
only targeted the ratable share provision of section 356(a)(2).138 In 
the 2016 Revenue Proposals, the Obama administration “proposes 
to align the available pool of earnings and profits to test for dividend 
treatment with the rules of section 316 governing ordinary 
distributions.”139 This would presumably eliminate both the ratable 
share provision and section 356(a)(2)’s reference to accumulated 
earnings. This would be a positive change that would eliminate the 
potential for abuse in closely held corporations and create 
consistency with the rest of the code.140 
The 2010 House bill accomplished the task of eliminating both 
the ratable share provision and the accumulated earnings provision 
by striking them and stating “then the amount of other property or 
money shall be treated as a dividend to the extent of the earnings 
and profits of the corporation.”141 The Joint Committee on Taxation 
 
 136. See 2016 Revenue Proposals, supra note 7, at 121. 
 137. See 2010 House Bill, supra note 134, § 422. 
 138. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 96 (2014), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2015.pdf. 
 139. 2016 Revenue Proposals, supra note 7, at 121. 
 140. See  infra Part III.C. 
 141. See 2010 House Bill, supra note134 § 422. 
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explained that the language in the 2010 House bill treats boot as a 
dividend to the extent of all earnings of the corporation and prevents 
any interpretation that excludes current year earnings.142 This 
language should be adopted and then improved by clarifying that 
“dividend” in section 356(a)(2) should have the same meaning as 
section 316: “then the amount of other property or money shall be 
treated as a dividend as defined in section 316.”143 
The 2010 House bill went further than the Obama proposals by 
adding a new subsection to section 356(a)(2). This subsection 
directed that the earnings of both the acquiring and the target 
corporation should be taken into account in Type D acquisitive 
reorganizations and “any other reorganization specified by the 
Secretary.”144 This would effectively adopt and broaden the IRS and 
Fifth Circuit’s view that earnings of both corporations should be 
taken into account when the ownership is identical. The House bill 
also directed that the amount which is a dividend will be determined 
under rules similar to section 304(b)(2) and (5),145 meaning that in 
most situations the earnings of the acquiring corporation will be 
looked at first (and reduced) followed by the earnings of the target 
corporation. This provision would solve a question left unanswered 
by section 356(a)(2) and should be adopted. 
The new subsection would apply to Type D acquisitive 
reorganizations as well as “other reorganization[s] specified by the 
Secretary.”146 The Joint Committee on Taxation explained that 
these other reorganizations may be triangular reorganizations that 
involve common control, but that the Secretary is not limited to 
triangular reorganizations.147 This broad grant of authority to the 
Treasury may create some uncertainty. The new subsection could be 
 
 142. See JCT Explanation, supra note 99, at 302–03. 
 143. It would be more consistent to borrow language from section 302(d) and state: 
“then the amount of other property or money shall be treated as a distribution of property to 
which section 301 applies.” However, this language would change the practice in section 
356(a)(2) of treating boot that has the effect of a dividend as a dividend to the extent of 
earnings and any excess as capital gain as opposed to a return of capital. See 26 U.S.C. § 301(c) 
(2012). In drafting the 2010 House bill, Congress intended that the practice of dividend 
treatment first then capital gain treatment remain intact. See JCT Explanation, supra note 99, 
at 302. 
 144. See 2010 House Bill, supra note 134, § 422. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See JCT Explanation, supra note 99, at 303. 
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improved by narrowing this grant of authority to reorganizations 
between parties under common control. Adding this provision 
would also validate the current practice of only looking to the target 
corporation’s earnings when ownership is not identical; however, 
legislative acquiescence is not typically viewed as a strong indicator of 
legislative intent.148 The provision could therefore be improved by 
stating that earnings of the target corporation will be the only 
earnings looked to except as otherwise specified. 
If the boot-within-gain limitation were repealed and the other 
recommended changes to section 356(a)(2) were adopted, there 
would be greater consistency in the tax code and tax loopholes 
would be closed. But another consequence would be an increase on 
the amount of boot that would be taxed if the boot has the effect of 
a dividend. Because the boot-within-gain limitation will survive 
under section 356(a)(1) when boot does not have the effect of a 
dividend, taxpayers will prefer to fall under section 356(a)(1). 
Therefore, Congress should provide a clear statutory test for when 
boot has the effect of a dividend and replace the Clark test with 
something less “artificial.” 
B. Fixing the Test for When Boot has the Effect of a Dividend 
The Obama proposals and the 2010 House bill do not change 
the test for dividend equivalency. Because changes to section 
356(a)(2) would raise the stakes for taxpayers, the Clark test should 
be supplanted with a test that more accurately reflects the economic 
realities of a reorganization. This proposed test, hereafter referred to 
as “Old Shimberg” (which is the same test the district court used in 
Shimberg149—hence the name Old Shimberg), compares the 
shareholder’s interest in the target corporation before the 
reorganization with the shareholder’s interest in the acquiring 
corporation after the reorganization. 
The Supreme Court rejected the Shimberg test because it would 
cause every pro rata distribution of boot to have the effect of a 
dividend.150 This was the correct result,151 but, as the Supreme Court 
 
 148. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 67 (1988). 
 149. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev’d, 577 F.2d 283 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
 150. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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recognized,152 Clark has its own shortcomings. First, Clark only 
looks at one side of the transaction and ignores the shareholder’s 
interests in relation to other target shareholders’ interests. Second, 
Clark does not account for preexisting interests a shareholder may 
have in the acquiring corporation. This can lead to abuse where a 
shareholder of the acquiring corporation is also a shareholder of the 
target corporation. 
For example, assume that S owns 25 out of 100 shares in the 
target corporation and 50 out of 100 shares in the acquiring 
corporation. The acquiring corporation acquires the target 
corporation in a qualifying reorganization for 100 newly issued 
shares of the acquiring corporation. As controlling shareholder of the 
acquiring corporation, S modifies the deal so that he receives cash for 
his target stock instead of acquiring corporation stock. Under the 
Clark test, S is deemed to have received 25 shares of the acquiring 
corporation’s stock to add to the 50 shares he already owns, 200 
shares of the acquiring corporation stock are deemed outstanding, 
and S has a 38% interest in the acquiring corporation after the 
reorganization. Then, S’s 25 shares are redeemed, the acquiring 
corporation only has 175 shares outstanding, and S has a 29% 
interest in the acquiring corporation.153 Under section 302(b), 
S’spost-redemption ownership is less than 80% (76% in this case) of 
his pre-redemption ownership in the acquiring corporation.154 
Therefore, the boot does not have the effect of a dividend and the 
boot is taxed as capital gain. But this result should not be correct 
because S has effectively increased his ownership interest in the 
target corporation from 25% to 29%. 
Comparing S’s ownership in the target corporation before the 
reorganization to S’s ownership interest in the acquiring corporation 
after the reorganization would solve this problem.155 In the situation 
above, S would own 25% before the reorganization and 29% after the 
reorganization. This is a 116% increase in interest.156 Therefore, the 
 
 151. See Michael L. Schler, Rebooting Section 356: Part 1—The Statute, TAX NOTES, July 
19, 2010, at 299. 
 152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 153. 50 shares owned divided by 175 shares outstanding. 
 154. 29% actual interest divided by the 38% deemed interest. 
 155. See Schler, supra note 152, at 299–300 (arguing that the dividend equivalency test 
should be applied using the Old Shimberg methodology). 
156. 29% post-acquisition interest divided by the 25% pre-acquisition interest. 
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boot would have the effect of a dividend. This reflects the economic 
reality of what happened: S used his position in the acquiring 
corporation to give himself cash in the transaction. Under Clark, S is 
able to bailout corporate earnings while avoiding dividend 
treatment. Old Shimberg closes this loophole. 
Old Shimberg would provide the same result as Clark in other 
circumstances where Clark reaches the right result. In the case of 
Clark itself, Old Shimberg would compare the taxpayer’s 100% 
interest in his corporation to his 0.92% interest in the acquiring 
corporation and the boot would be treated as capital gain.157 But Old 
Shimberg fixes Clark’s shortcomings by looking at both sides of the 
transaction and considering shareholders’ preexisting interests in the 
acquiring corporation. 
The Fifth Circuit overturned Old Shimberg because the boot 
distribution was pro rata.158 Because the boot distribution was pro 
rata, the target corporation shareholders could not have had a 
meaningful reduction in their interests in the target corporation.159 
But as the Supreme Court in Clark pointed out, this effectively 
brought back the automatic dividend rule.160 Unfortunately, the Old 
Shimberg test was not considered in Clark. 
Arguably, Old Shimberg has one shortcoming. As the Fifth 
Circuit pointed out in rejecting Old Shimberg, any time the acquiring 
corporation is considerably larger than the target corporation the 
boot will be treated as capital gain.161 However, this shortcoming is 
not a shortcoming of Old Shimberg; it is a shortcoming of the 
current state of the continuity of interest doctrine.162 Any time a 
closely-held corporation is acquired by a large, publicly-held 
corporation the shareholders who controlled the closely-held 
 
 157. Old Shimberg will reach the same result as Clark when a shareholder receives a 
disproportionate amount of boot in a reorganization. For example, say S owns 20 out of 100 
shares of the target corporation and no shares of the acquiring corporation. In a qualifying 
reorganization, all of the shareholders receive one share of the acquiring corporation for each 
of their shares in the target corporation. But S receives only 10 shares and some cash. Under 
Clark, S would go from 10% to 5% resulting in capital gains treatment. Under Old Shimberg, S 
would go from 20% to 5% resulting in capital gains treatment. 
 158. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989). 
 161. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288. 
 162. The current state of the continuity of interest doctrine and its effect on the overall 
reorganization regime is briefly discussed in Part IV.C. 
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corporation become mere profit shareholders—that is, shareholders 
without a controlling interest in the target corporation as an ongoing 
concern. The continuity of interest doctrine allows this result by only 
focusing on the nature of the consideration in a reorganization and 
not requiring shareholders to retain control. 
Because the continuity of interest doctrine allows controlling 
shareholders to sell their corporation and become insignificant 
shareholders in the acquiring corporation, Old Shimberg accurately 
reflects economic realities by giving capital gains treatment to such 
reorganizations. The Old Shimberg court illustrated this reality: 
No longer was [the former majority stockholder of the target 
corporation] the major ‘owner’ of a successful local company . . . . 
He was then the holder of a miniscule percentage of the 
outstanding stock of a huge, publicly-held corporation. It is clear 
that the merger resulted in a radical change and meaningful 
reduction in the nature of the [taxpayer’s] interest in the 
continuing business. The net effect of the transaction was a sale by 
the [taxpayer] . . . of [his] LSC stock to MGIC for cash and 
marketable securities in a publicly owned corporation.163 
In sum, because the recommended revisions to section 356(a)(2) 
would increase the amount of boot subject to tax, Congress should 
specify when boot has the effect of a dividend. Congress should 
statutorily adopt Old Shimberg as the test for when boot has the 
effect of a dividend.164 This test closes loopholes and more accurately 
reflects the economic realities of reorganizations by comparing 
ownership interests before and after the reorganization. 
C. Afterword: Fixing the Continuity of Interest Doctrine 
As an afterword, it is worth discussing the conflict the current 
approach to dividend equivalency has with the continuity of interest 
doctrine. The current approach uses principles from section 302 to 
determine if boot has the effect of a dividend.165 The section 302 test 
determines whether a redemption of stock by a shareholder results in 
enough of a “meaningful reduction in interest” to tax the property 
received as capital gain. In other words, the redemption test seeks to 
determine discontinuity of interest. Tax-free reorganizations, on the 
 
 163. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832, 836–37 (M.D. Fla. 1976). 
 164. See Schler, supra note 152, at 300 (arguing the same). 
 165. See supra Part II.F. 
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other hand, are premised on the idea that shareholders are 
continuing their interest in the corporation and, therefore, no 
taxable sale has taken place.166 This practice of applying section 302 
to section 356 may seem suspect. But as one commentator points 
out, the problems in the current regime do not stem from this 
inherent conflict, but instead stem from the current state of the 
continuity of interest doctrine.167 
The general rule for continuity of interest is that at least 40% of 
the consideration received must be the acquiring corporation’s 
stock.168 But if continuity of interest required the shareholders to 
collectively obtain a substantial continuing ownership interest in the 
acquiring corporation, then the concern of shareholders selling their 
interest but receiving tax-free treatment disappears. And the 
uncomfortableness of applying section 302 to section 356 
disappears. This is because, although the individual shareholder may 
have cashed-out some of his interest, the shareholders as a whole will 
have a substantial continuing interest in the acquiring corporation.169 
Compare this to the current regime where the shareholders of a 
corporation may reduce their collective ownership of 100% in the 
target corporation to 3% in the acquiring corporation. As long as 
40%170 of the consideration is paid in stock, the shareholders’ 
interests are deemed to continue for purposes of the continuity of 
interest requirement. 
This issue has been covered elsewhere171 and is outside of the 
scope of this Comment, which focuses on section 356(a)(2) 
specifically. But this issue is mentioned because a total fix to section 
356(a)(2) may require a fix to the principal rule underlying tax-
free reorganizations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Obama administration and the House of Representatives 
have recently made efforts to reform section 356(a)(2). Section 
 
 166. See supra Part I.A. 
 167. See Massey, supra note 114, at 139–40. 
 168. See supra Part II.B.. 
 169. See Massey, supra note 114, at 140. 
 170. Note that 40% is a minimum threshold. Different types of reorganizations may set 
out stricter requirements. 
 171. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 114; See also Skillman, supra note 12, for a more 
generalized discussion on the underlying policies and doctrines of tax-free reorganizations. 
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356(a)(2) treats dividends inconsistently with the rest of the code 
without justification. Section 356(a)(2) also leaves taxpayers with 
uncertainty as to how several of its provisions apply. It also provides 
opportunities for tax avoidance. The boot-within-gain limitation has 
received particular attention by the Obama administration, as well as 
commentators, because of the opportunity it creates for repatriation 
of offshore earnings and general tax avoidance. 
Section 356(a)(2) should be amended to fix these problems by 
adopting the Obama proposals and the 2010 House bill 
amendments along with the recommendations discussed above. 
These revisions would eliminate the boot-within-gain limitation and 
the ratable share rule. The revisions would direct that earnings of the 
current year be counted first, followed by accumulated earnings. And 
the revisions would clarify whose earnings must be considered. These 
changes would make section 356(a)(2) consistent with the rest of 
the code and eliminate opportunities to bailout corporate earnings. 
Congress should also amend section 356(a)(2) to state when 
boot has the effect of a dividend. The amendment should supplant 
the current Clark rule with the Old Shimberg rule. The Old Shimberg 
rule compares the shareholder’s interest in the target corporation 
before the reorganization with the shareholder’s interest in the 
acquiring corporation after the reorganization and determines 
whether there has been a meaningful reduction in interest under 
section 302(b). This test more accurately reflects the economic 
realities of a reorganization. Specifically, it improves on the Clark 
test by taking into account the shareholder’s interest on both sides of 
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